By Jigyasa Pareek

The Calcutta High Court in NOCIL Ltd. vs Finorchem Ltd. & Anr. [IP-COM/25/2024, GA-COM/1/2024, decision dated October 7, 2026] granted interim injunction in favour of NOCIL in a suit concerning alleged infringement of its process patents for manufacturing 4-ADPA and breach of confidentiality by a former employee engaged by Finorchem (Defendant No. 1). The Court found that the Plaintiff had established a strong prima facie case, while the Defendant had failed to raise a credible challenge to the validity of the suit patents. The Court’s assessment took into account the striking similarity between the parties’ Environmental Impact and Risk Assessment (EIRA) Reports disclosing the manufacturing process of 4-ADPA, the role of the Defendant No. 2 in accessing NOCIL’s confidential information and trade secrets relating to the product 4 ADPA, Finorchem’s failure to take steps to “clear the way” before commencing its activities, and the Defendants’ conduct and inconsistent explanations concerning the process employed.

NOCIL had developed and patented processes for manufacturing 4-ADPA, a chemical intermediate used in the manufacture of rubber antioxidants. Its patents IN’341922, IN’366559 and IN’389262 covered processes for manufacturing the compound. Defendant No. 2, who had worked with NOCIL from 1987 until his retirement as DGM–Process Technology in 2020, had been involved in developing and implementing the proprietary processes and had executed a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) in 2012 specifically concerning the technology.

NOCIL instituted the suit after discovering Finorchem’s EIRA Report for its proposed manufacture of 4-ADPA, alleging that the disclosed process was substantially similar to its patented processes and that Defendant No. 2 had shared confidential technical information after joining Finorchem. Approximately 15 months after the suit was instituted, Finorchem filed a patent application for its own 4-ADPA manufacturing process which was allegedly the same as the process covered by the suit patents with trifling differences. Following an order dated November 26, 2025, directing Finorchem to provide proof of the process it employed, it sought twelve amendments to its patent application in February 2026. NOCIL contended that the proposed amendments sought to introduce drastic differences to evade infringement, including replacing a specified molar ratio of aniline to nitrobenzene with the vague expression “predetermined ratio” and making the second hydrogenation step optional. NOCIL argued that these changes raised questions about the correctness and completeness of Finorchem’s earlier disclosure on oath and indicated an attempt to recast and disguise the real process to avoid the consequences of infringement. Notably, the patent application was subsequently abandoned.

While the Court reiterated that the grant of a patent does not create a presumption of validity, it held that the fact that a patent which has been granted after examination in India and foreign jurisdictions, and has been worked and commercially exploited for years deserves recognition at the prima facie stage.

The Court noted that Finorchem’s EIRA Report disclosed a process virtually identical to NOCIL’s and it was not persuaded by the contention that both reports were prepared by the same agency. Significantly, it considered Finorchem’s failure to clear the way before proceeding with a process that potentially fell within the scope of the existing patents. The Court observed that a prospective entrant who intends to launch a process potentially covered by an existing patent should take steps to remove the legal impediment before commencing its activities, rather than waiting to be sued. In the present case, Finorchem had not availed itself of the available statutory mechanisms, including pre-grant or post-grant opposition, a declaratory suit under Section 105, proceedings for restoration under Section 106, or revocation under Section 64 of the Patents Act. This omission weighed in favour of granting interim protection. 

The Court observed that Finorchem had disclosed different versions of its manufacturing process during the proceedings. Its EIRA Report disclosed a process substantially identical to NOCIL’s, with an asserted distinction concerning the catalyst; this distinction was subsequently found not to be false as the catalyst was the same. Further, an affidavit filed by Finorchem before the Court disclosed its patent application which was virtually the same as NOCIL’s with only trifling differences. During the hearing, Finorchem disclosed that it had applied to amend its patent application, which the Court held was ‘nothing more than an attempt to evade liability for infringement’.

In assessing infringement, the Court emphasised that the comparison must focus on the granted claims of the suit patents and the process employed by Finorchem, with particular attention to the essential inventive features or “pith and marrow” of the patented process. The Court relied on the uncontroverted expert evidence and found, at the interim stage, that the processes shared substantial features and that the differences relied upon by Finorchem were minor or inconsequential. It also considered that both processes had the same ingredients and produced the same product.

The Court also rejected Finorchem’s reliance on prior art as sufficient to establish a credible challenge to the suit patents. It noted that the cited prior art had been considered or addressed during examination and in corresponding foreign proceedings. The Court rejected the attempt to rely on different citations collectively to contend that the patented process was known, observing that mosaicing was impermissible in the manner sought by the Defendant. Accordingly, the Court found that Finorchem had not established a prima facie basis to conclude that the suit patents were liable to be revoked.

On the burden of proof, the Court considered Section 104A of the Patents Act, which provides for shifting the burden to the Defendant in process patent infringement cases. It held that where the plaintiff has shown that the processes resulted in the same product, the burden lay on the defendant to establish that it employed a different process. The Court rejected the contention that NOCIL was first required to establish the validity of its patents before relying on Section 104A. It also distinguished Hindusthan Lever, noting, among other things, that the patent in that case had not been worked or commercially exploited and that the Defendant had challenged its validity before the infringement suit.

The Court separately examined the allegation of breach of confidentiality by Defendant No. 2. The NDA expressly concerned the 4-ADPA project and the unique processes and methods being developed at the laboratory and pilot stages. The Court rejected the contention that Defendant No. 2 had been employed only in an administrative capacity, noting that the NDA itself, together with his qualifications and the available appraisal and assessment records, demonstrated his involvement with the relevant plant operations and 4-ADPA processes. His evasive responses and failure to personally affirm pleadings concerning his engagement with Finorchem further weighed against him. The Court also rejected the argument that a claim for patent infringement and a claim for breach of confidentiality were mutually destructive. The fact that information may contain elements disclosed in a patent does not necessarily deprive the remaining information of its confidential character. The Court noted that the law does not require every piece of information known to an inventor to be disclosed in a patent specification, and that information may retain the quality of confidence even where some of its constituent elements are in the public domain. The Defendants’ cumulative conduct weighed in the Court’s assessment of whether interim relief was warranted.

Section 12A proceedings

The decision followed an earlier order of the Calcutta High Court in GA-COM/2/2024, where the Defendants had sought revocation of the dispensation granted to NOCIL from pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The Court had declined to revoke the dispensation, holding that the Plaintiff’s delay could not be considered in isolation where the plaint disclosed continuing enquiries into the Defendants’ engagement and alleged use of NOCIL’s confidential information. Considering the Supreme Court’s decision in Yamini Manohar vs T.K.D. Keerthi, the Court held that the limited scrutiny under Section 12A was directed at cases involving deception, suppression or falsely created urgency, none of which was established on the pleadings. This application was accordingly dismissed.

The Court also cautioned against an overly intrusive examination of the Plaintiff’s decision to invoke the urgent-relief exception. It observed that the Plaintiff, being dominus litis, is in the best position to determine whether urgency exists for instituting the suit. While the Court retains a limited role to ensure that Section 12A is not circumvented through deception or a falsely created urgency, the examination at this stage does not require a “forensic analysis of the plaint” or an assessment of every day’s delay. Nor can the reopening of a previously granted dispensation become a weapon in the hands of every Defendant seeking to challenge the institution of the suit.