In Jain Irrigation Systems Ltd. vs Dura‑Line India Pvt. Ltd. [RFA(OS)(COMM) 4/2026], the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dealt with two applications filed by the Appellant under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for condonation of delay in filing and re-filing the subject appeal against the dismissal of its counter-claim in the patent infringement suit numbered CS(COMM) 245/2017.

The underlying suit had been decreed in favour of the patentee/Plaintiff (Dura‑Line) and simultaneously the Defendant’s counter-claim for revocation of the suit patent IN’199722 was dismissed by the Single Judge of the Delhi High Court vide common judgement dated May 19, 2025.  

The Defendant-now-Appellant, Jain Irrigation Systems, filed a timely appeal (RFA(OS)(COMM) 24/2025) against the decree of permanent injunction. However, it failed to file a separate appeal against the dismissal of its revocation counter-claim within the statutory limitation period.

The Appellant filed the subject appeal (RFA(OS)(COMM) 4/2026) after a 54 days delay in filing and 111 days delay in re‑filing. The Appellant attributed the delay to incorrect legal advice, under which it believed the first appeal sufficed to challenge both the suit as well as the dismissal of the counter-claim. For the delay in re-filing, it was contended that its file size exceeded the e‑filing portal’s 100 MB cap and that the Appellant re-filed the appeal seven times to clear the defects.

The Respondent opposed the applications, contending that an appeal against the dismissal of a counter-claim is independent in nature and cannot be subsumed within an appeal against the decree in the suit. It was further urged that ignorance of law, even when occasioned by incorrect legal advice, does not constitute “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Emphasis was also placed on the settled position that the power to condone delay in commercial matters must be exercised as an exception.

The Court took a fact‑sensitive and equitable approach:

• Prejudice to the Respondent: The Court underscored that the relevant enquiry is whether the delay had led the Respondent to reasonably believe that the Appellant had accepted the impugned judgment, and whether, acting on such belief, the Respondent had altered its position in a manner that would render the revival of the lis inequitable. The Court illustratively observed that in patent disputes, if a revocation challenge is not pursued within limitation and the patentee, proceeding on the basis of finality, assigns the patent to third parties, the entertainment of a belated appeal could result in manifest prejudice to the patentee as well as its assignees. However, on the facts at hand, the Court noted that the Appellant had, within the limitation period, already instituted RFA(OS)(COMM) 24/2025 challenging the decree of injunction arising from the common judgment. This, in the Court’s view, was sufficient to put the Respondent on notice that the Appellant had not accepted the findings of the Single Judge, while maintaining the challenge to the findings of validity of the suit patent. The pendency of the said appeal indicated that the dispute had not attained finality, and that the issue of patent validity remained sub judice. In these circumstances, the Court held that no equity had accrued in favour of the Respondent so as to disentitle the Appellant from seeking condonation of delay.
• Bona fide conduct of the Appellant: Noting that the term “sufficient cause” ought to be interpreted to give primacy to the bona fides of the Appellant over the mere length of the delay, the Court examined whether the reliance on incorrect legal advice was the cause of the bona fide delay or merely a convenient pretext to mask negligence. On facts, the Court found that the Appellant had acted with due diligence in pursuing the appellate remedy, having promptly instituted an appeal against the decree of permanent injunction within the prescribed period. There was no conduct suggesting an attempt to gain advantage by delaying the revocation appeal. The Court emphasised that “a delay, particularly one that is unintentional, ought not to ordinarily result in the foreclosure of a valuable statutory right of appeal”. The Court thus held that the Appellant had made out sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 54 days.
• Delay in re‑filing: The Court underscored that the delay in re-filing is essentially a matter between the Court and the litigant. On examining the record, the Court noted that the Appellant had re-filed the appeal on seven occasions after addressing the office objections, which demonstrated a continuing effort to pursue the matter. The delay was attributed to the inability of counsel to cure the defects within time, and the Court clarified that such inefficiency could not be attributed to the Appellant as an indication of any lack of intent to pursue the listing of the appeal. The Court further observed that the delay had also not impacted the hearing of the connected appeal RFA(OS)(COMM) 24/2025 which remained pending. In these circumstances, the Court concluded that no prejudice had been caused to the Respondent on account of the delay in re-filing.

In view of the foregoing, the Court condoned the 54 days filing delay and 111 days re‑filing delay, allowing the appeal to proceed. However, it imposed costs of Rs. 1,00,000 on the Appellant for the delay in re‑filing.