In the case of Kannan Gopalakrishnan vs Controller of Patents & Anr. [Writ Petition (IPD) No.36 of 2025], the Madras High Court presents an instructive example of how constitutional equity may operate at the margins of patentability, without unsettling exclusions embedded in the Patents Act, 1970.

The writ petition sought dismissal of the order-in-review issued under Section 77(1)(f) of the Patents Act which upheld the rejection of a patent application number 202047033549, entitled “Solar Supplemental Power Source” on the ground of non-patentability under Section 3(a). The invention claimed a prime mover, described as an electro-mechanical device capable of generating electricity even in the absence of sunlight. As set out in the impugned order, the system comprised a wheel structure fitted with multiple arms and arm loads, regulated by a feeder box operating through threaded guides. According to the applicant, the interaction of buoyant and gravitational forces would create an imbalance in the wheel, causing continuous rotation, which could then be coupled to an electrical generator.

In the review petition, the Petitioner had contended that a working prototype existed and could be demonstrated. Video links and material purporting to show implementation of the invention were placed on record, and the Petitioner sought an opportunity to be heard and to demonstrate the working of the device. The review petition was, however, dismissed by the Controller on the ground that no case for review had been made out and that there was no justification to interfere with the rejection order passed under Section 15 of the Act.

Before the High Court, the Petitioner framed the challenge primarily in terms of procedural fairness, contending that the review petition had been dismissed without affording a fair opportunity of hearing. The Respondents, on the other hand, maintained that adequate opportunities had already been granted during prosecution and that the review jurisdiction could not be used as a vehicle for re-agitating the merits of the rejection.

At the outset, the Court noted that review proceedings under the Patents Act are governed by principles analogous to Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Applying this settled standard, the Court expressly held that it could discern no error apparent on the face of the record in the rejection order. Nor did the Court find fault with the dismissal of the review petition, particularly in light of the fact that opportunities of hearing had already been afforded during prosecution.

Yet, having affirmed the soundness of the impugned order, the Court stopped short of dismissing the writ petition outright. Taking note of the Petitioner’s assertion that a working prototype existed and acknowledging that the Petitioner had “applied his mind in inventing a product”, the Court exercised its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 to grant an opportunity to the Petitioner. The Petitioner was directed to make the prototype available for demonstration before the Controller within four weeks, and the Controller was directed to permit such demonstration and thereafter render a reasoned decision within four months.

The concluding observation in the judgment makes it explicit that the direction was issued “more on the ground of equity”, with the objective of ensuring that an asserted invention does not go waste and that all possible opportunities are afforded to sustain it. The decision thus reflects a calibrated judicial approach.